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Abstract 
This paper examines school structure, spending, and performance relationships in California and ﬁnds considerable 
support for the public exchange model that predicts that greater competition improves student performance. The evi­
dence indicates that, despite claims to the contrary by many advocates of public education, higher education spending 
does not raise student achievement. Education spending is also shown to be highest in those counties exhibiting highest 
monopoly power as measured by the Herﬁndahl index. Strong support is also shown for the public exchange view that 
higher market power leads to lower student achievement in the fourth and eighth grades, but little support is shown 
for the tenth grade. 
1. Introduction	 schools provide 90% of primary and secondary edu­
cation in a public market that has experienced a dramatic 
A common perception is that US public schools per- reduction in numbers of school districts — from 108,579 
form poorly and that conditions are worsening over time. to 14,556 over 1942–1992.2 This paper examines how 
Until recently, the predominant view toward reversing the structure of the public school system inﬂuences both 
the perceived performance decline was to raise overall education spending and student performance. A model 
spending, enabling expansion of staff and salaries, capi- of public exchange provides the framework for hypo-
tal improvements, professional staff development, school thesizing how voters and education policy makers 
construction and maintenance, and adoption of new tech- exchange with one another within school districts. The 
nologies such as computers. An alternative viewpoint relation between school district structure and spending is 
argues that problems are primarily a product of the mon- shown to be an empirical matter because a high concen­
opoly position of the public school system.1 US public tration of school districts may lower spending if scale 
economies are experienced, but as concentration rises, 
spending may rise as well as policy makers exploit 
enhanced monopoly powers. This paper also examines 
whether higher spending remedies performance prob­1 Other viewpoints emphasize school choice vouchers and lems.charter schools. Those who believe that the public school sys- School structure, spending and performance relation-tem is a monopoly protected from competition — both by priv­
ate schools and by neighboring public schools — often advocate 
school vouchers. Charter schools are outside the control of local 
school boards and may ignore state education codes, as well as 2 Data on number of school districts obtained from various 
develop their own curricula. issues of Census of Governments, US Bureau of the Census. 
ships in California are examined. California is a state 
that appears to mirror national trends, but at the same 
time is at the forefront of national concern.3 The Califor­
nia public school system (primary and secondary) is the 
nation’s largest with 1002 school districts, employing 
over 410,000 workers servicing over 5.3 million pupils 
with funding of $32 billion in 1996–97. California has 
also experienced a dramatic rise in student population — 
over 1.2 million since 1983–84, which represents more 
students than currently served by 42 other states. Pre­
vious studies often rely on cross-state examination, but 
this approach ignores differences in budgetary insti­
tutions across states. For example, California’s Prop­
osition 98 of 1988 guarantees minimum levels of state 
support for all schools and is an important determinant 
of school spending levels. Because each state has its own 
budgetary institutions and mandates, cross-state examin­
ation may incorrectly conclude that variation in spending 
or performance is caused by various factors (e.g., differ­
ences in school structure, demographics or income) when 
that variation results from differences in budgetary insti­
tutions. This paper avoids this problem by testing 
hypotheses only on data from California.4 
2. Public education markets 
2.1. Model of public exchange 
External beneﬁts may explain why many citizens 
advocate a strong governmental presence in elementary 
and secondary education.5 External beneﬁts arise when 
there are third-party beneﬁciaries, such as the community 
and state, when education is produced and consumed. 
Because private suppliers cater only to demands of pri­
mary beneﬁciaries, a market failure arises whereby the 
private market under-provides education in the sense that 
3 The following statistics are provided by the California 
Department of Education and the California Legislative Ana­
lysts’ Ofﬁce. 
4 Focus on a single state is also consistent with the argument 
of Hanushek, Rivkin and Taylor (1996) that empirical studies 
should focus on comparing all schools within a school district, 
or all school districts within one state. They ﬁnd that the biases 
introduced by aggregation to state-level data inﬂate the effects 
of school resources on performance. While the present study 
examines data on counties, this may not be subject to much 
aggregation bias because counties are the location of school 
boards in California. Moreover, school ﬁnance is mostly cen­
tralized at the state capital, thus removing much of the funding 
factors that might arise when counties or school districts are 
given greater autonomy to self-ﬁnance their own programs. 
5 Lott (1987) offers an alternative view that public schooling 
provides the means to indoctrinate students to views that policy 
makers believe they should believe. 
marginal social beneﬁts outweigh marginal social costs. 
Of course, while public provision may remedy the mar­
ket failure, public market provision may also over-pro­
vide in the sense that marginal social costs outweigh 
marginal social beneﬁts.6 A symptom of over-provision 
is over-funding of public education. 
The ﬁnancing of public education explains why public 
schools dominate the supply of education. Public edu­
cation is funded through all taxpayers, and individual tax 
bills are unrelated to whether taxpayers have children 
attending public schools and to the numbers of school-
age children. This is simply a consequence of the ability-
to-pay principle of taxation whereby tax bills are not 
assigned on the basis of beneﬁts received from policies. 
Presence of third-party beneﬁciaries may also partly 
explain why all taxpayers share ﬁnancing burdens. In any 
event, primary recipients of public education are essen­
tially charged zero unit prices under this tax method. In 
contrast, private education is funded according to the 
beneﬁts principle of ﬁnance whereby unit prices reﬂect 
non-zero marginal (private) costs of education provision. 
Private education therefore carries a unit price that far 
exceeds the zero unit price of public education and, as 
a result, public education dominates the education mar­
ket, thus leaving the private market relatively small and 
perhaps not a particularly strong competitor to public 
education. Public education therefore dominates the total 
(private and public) market, with relatively little compe­
tition from the private market.7 Until school vouchers or 
other policies signiﬁcantly break the price advantage, the 
public market will most likely continue to dominate the 
education market. 
A public exchange model has voters and policy mak­
ers exchanging with one another within a public edu­
cation market that is segmented into school districts. 
Voters and parents signal preferences to policy makers 
in ways that include dealing directly with teachers, prin­
cipals, school boards, and PTAs, as well as voting for 
politicians with compatible views.8 Exit options, or “vot­
ing-with-your-feet” as developed in Tiebout (1956), are 
last resorts when, for instance, dissatisﬁed parents move 
from one school district to another as they search for 
desired education policies. A system of competing 
school districts provides parents with choices that create 
incentives for policy makers to be responsive to parental 
preferences for quality education. 
6 See, for example, Sonstelie (1982). 
7 An expanding literature on private schools is evolving; see 
West and Palsson (1988), Hamilton and Macauley (1991), Mar­
tinez-Vazquez and Seaman (1985), Couch, Shughart and Willi­
ams (1993), and Newmark (1995). 
8 These options are discussed in Hirschman (1970). For a 
more detailed examination of the roles of voice and exit see 
Marlow (1992). This paper’s public exchange model in edu­
cation follows the framework developed in Marlow (1997). 
Evidence supports the notion that communities are 
concerned about the quality of their public schools. 
Black (1997) uses housing prices to infer the value par­
ents place on school quality, where school quality is pro­
xied by elementary school test scores. She infers values 
by looking within school districts along only one dimen­
sion: the elementary school the child attends. After con­
trolling for school ﬁnancial inputs and neighborhoods, 
higher test scores are found to be associated with higher 
housing prices; a 5% increase in test scores leads to 2.1% 
rise in house prices. Black (1997) concludes that this 
relationship demonstrates that parents are sensitive to 
apparently small differences in school performance, as 
measured by housing prices. Of course, all homeowners, 
with or without school-age children, will tend to be con­
cerned as well because of the connection between the 
quality of local schools and housing prices. 
There is also evidence that supports the notion that 
not all parents, or communities, prefer the same type of 
public school system. Areas that have greater variation 
in economic characteristics, or preferences, of residents 
are shown to have greater numbers of school districts 
than those with less variation. Fisher and Wassmer 
(1998) examined school districts in the 167 largest 
metropolitan areas in 1982 and ﬁnd that there are more 
smaller local districts when the differences among citi­
zens with regard to desired government services 
expands. That is, in order for there to be relatively few 
school districts, citizens must display relatively little 
diversity in preferences for the mix of government ser­
vices provided. This view is reinforced in Martinez-Vaz­
quez, Rider and Walker (1997) who ﬁnd that income, 
age, and racial variation in communities play a role in 
determining numbers of school districts. These studies 
suggest that greater variation of preferences among resi­
dents leads to greater choices in public education pro­
viders. Greater variety in choices will be reﬂected in 
policies as well as sizes of schools and districts. 
School district options, or choices, play a pivotal role 
in establishing the degree of leverage that parents exer­
cise over school teachers, administrators and staff. Flee­
ing to competing districts jeopardizes funding bases of 
school districts that lose students and is akin to private 
suppliers losing customers to competitors that offer bet­
ter products or lower prices. Ease of ﬂeeing is related to 
proximity of competitors as well as number of alternative 
suppliers. With relatively few competitors, the Leviathan 
view of Brennan and Buchanan (1980) predicts that pol­
icy makers will pursue budgets and behaviors reﬂecting 
their narrow interests, as opposed to those of parents and 
taxpayers. The range of interested policy makers 
includes teachers, union ofﬁcials, and school staff. 
Higher spending associated with lack of competition 
may therefore reﬂect higher salaries, shorter working 
hours, more teaching assistants, more paid holidays, and 
other forms of compensation that may not be directly 
related to student performance. This view is consistent 
with Niskanen’s (1971) theory of bureaucracy whereby 
government policy makers maximize functions other 
than proﬁts, such as non-pecuniary income — obviously 
an issue for public education since policy makers do not 
operate under a proﬁt-maximization constraint.9 
There is some evidence that indicates that public edu­
cation spending may not always be directed toward 
improving student performance. Duplantis, Chandler and 
Geske (1995) ﬁnd that unionization and collective bar­
gaining are reasons behind cost escalation in public edu­
cation. Kurth (1987) ﬁnds that the presence of teachers’ 
unions exerts negative inﬂuences on test scores. Hoxby 
(1996) concludes that teachers’ unions increase school 
inputs (e.g., teacher salaries, per-student expenditures, 
and teacher–student ratios), but reduce productivity suf­
ﬁciently to raise drop-out rates. Unionization may there­
fore partially explain why public schools can simul­
taneously cost more and perform more poorly over time. 
However, unionization effects are probably not 
important in the present study since California is a heav­
ily unionized state and therefore little inter-county vari­
ation in unionization should exist. It should also be noted 
that Eberts and Stone (1984) ﬁnd that union schools are 
more productive (based on pre- and post-test scores) than 
non-union schools for the average elementary student. 
Therefore the evidence is mixed on the effect of unioniz­
ation on school performance. 
Within the public education market of California there 
appears to be untapped potential for extensive compe­
tition between and within school districts. There are over 
7700 public schools within over 1000 school districts 
and 57 counties. However, in most cases, parents have 
very limited choices about which school they may send 
their children to since they are assigned a particular 
school within their district.10 “Exclusive territories” cre­
ate monopolies within districts whereby parents must 
move to other neighborhoods if they wish to send their 
children to better schools, even though moves may only 
be a block or so from present locations. This arrange­
ment restricts exit options, thus reinforcing monopolistic 
power stemming from how ﬁnancing systems crowd-out 
private schools. The public exchange model predicts that 
Leviathan policy makers take advantage of monopoly 
power, as revealed by over-expanded budgets and rela­
tively low student performance. This model also predicts 
9 On the bureaucracy issue in public education, Anderson, 
Shughart and Tollison (1991) ﬁnd that states with relatively 
large numbers of administrative personnel also have lower stud­
ent achievement on standardized tests and higher drop-out rates. 
However, Brewer (1996) ﬁnds that the number of administrators 
does not exert negative impacts on student achievement in New 
York schools. 
10 West (1990) discusses this issue. 
that greater public funding will not necessarily improve 
performance since it is likely that spending hikes will be 
diverted away from uses that are most closely connected 
to student performance. 
2.2. Counterviews: scale economies and shared 
taxation 
A competing view is that quality improvement simply 
requires higher funding and an emphasis on greater com­
petition may raise spending as smaller public 
schools/districts are less able to exploit scale economies. 
However, while economies of scale may arise in edu­
cation, past consolidation of districts does not appear to 
have been prompted by attempts to lower costs. Kenny 
and Schmidt (1994) argue that attempts to exploit scale 
economies are one of three factors that explain school 
district consolidation over 1950–1980. The other two 
factors are state aid growth, which lowered quality dif­
ferences between districts, and growing powers of teach­
ers’ unions using consolidation to lower costs of organiz­
ing memberships. 
Another counterview is Rivlin’s (1992) argument that 
inter-governmental competition mostly leads to ﬁghts 
over which jurisdictions can lower tax burdens the quick­
est. Competition has two defects according to this view: 
it results in tax revenues that do not meet the needs of 
governments (i.e., under-taxation) and it reinforces the 
fact that jurisdictions have unequal resources.11 Rivlin 
(1992) proposes “uniform shared taxes” as a correction 
whereby (state) governments pool tax revenues and then 
return them with some emphasis on redistributing rev­
enues from richer to poorer states. Shared taxation 
removes taxpayer incentives to ﬂee governments on the 
basis of “high” tax policies because local governments 
have little control over tax policies when all governments 
share taxes set at uniform rates. Because this framework 
assumes that governments will then only compete on the 
basis of beneﬁts provided rather than taxes levied, social 
welfare is predicted to rise. This view also assumes that 
benevolent, as opposed to Leviathan, policy makers do 
not exploit enhanced monopoly powers that arise from 
shared taxation, but simply focus on providing higher-
quality programs through enhanced revenue-raising abili­
ties. 
How a system of shared uniform taxation would 
inﬂuence behavior is clear under the public exchange 
model. Shared taxation protects and increases monopoly 
positions of governments since it prevents governments 
11 While Rivlin (1992) makes the case against inter-govern­
mental competition between state governments, the general case 
appears to be about governmental competition and therefore 
could be applied to competition between school districts as 
well. 
from competing on the basis of tax policies, thus effec­
tively creating one large monopoly government from 
which taxpayers/citizens may not easily escape. Self-
interested policy makers then operate under enhanced 
monopoly positions that contribute to lower-quality, 
more costly programs. The public exchange model there­
fore predicts that shared taxation contributes to perform­
ance that falls below what would arise under a system 
of many governments, or private schools, each of which 
competes for tax revenues, private tuition revenues and 
students. 
2.3. California’s system of shared taxation 
Much of school ﬁnance in California is a product of 
shared taxation.12 While 25 years ago local school dis­
tricts were mostly funded by locally derived revenues, 
funding decisions are now dominated by budgetary 
decisions made in the state capital of Sacramento. These 
decisions are inﬂuenced by Propositions 13 and 98, with 
the latter passed in 1988 and mandating minimum fund­
ing guarantees for kindergarten through community col­
leges. Proposition 98 constraints now account for 
roughly 80% of total funding. Perhaps the most 
important budgetary constraint is that imposed by the 
Serrano vs. Priest ruling of 1972 in which the Supreme 
Court of California required restructuring of the school 
ﬁnance system to virtually eliminate spending differ­
ences between school districts on the basis of wealth. 
The California legislature then imposed revenue limits 
on districts and provided $2.4 billion in additional fund­
ing for poorer school districts. In effect, court rulings 
mandated that school ﬁnance be tied to a system of 
shared taxation whereby the state government was 
responsible for collecting taxes from local governments 
and then returning revenues to school districts on the 
basis of various factors such as numbers of students and 
redistribution to poorer districts. This system therefore 
limits the abilities of local school ofﬁcials to make fund­
ing decisions and constrains inter-district competition by 
limiting the ability of school districts to demonstrate that 
they use local funds wisely, since funding comes from 
a common base in Sacramento. This funding arrange­
ment may lead to a commons problem whereby lack of 
property rights to tax dollars leads to over-use of the 
revenue base since providers of tax dollars are not neces­
sarily the ones primarily beneﬁting from use of those 
tax dollars.13 
12 See California Legislative Analyst’s Ofﬁce (1995) for a 
discussion of school ﬁnance. 
13 Wagner (1992) refers to a ﬁscal process where choice is 
divorced from liability, taxes or public debt, as one of “ﬁscal 
irresponsibility” and creates a “commons” institutional setting 
that promotes over-spending. 
Of course, many school districts — especially wealthy 
ones — did not particularly like shared taxation whereby 
portions of local tax revenues ﬂowed to other school dis­
tricts. Fischel (1988) argues that Proposition 13 was 
caused by Serrano since it allowed high-property-value 
school districts/counties to bypass some of the redistri­
bution (from high- to low-property-value counties) 
required by Serrano. Proposition 13 capped property tax 
rates and growth in assessed value, reducing by 54% the 
amount of property taxes available to fund services pro­
vided by cities, counties, school districts, and other 
government agencies. Silva and Sonstelie (1995) ﬁnd 
that Serrano created some equalization across school dis­
tricts, but also is partially responsible for some of the 
decline in average funding per student across California. 
In a comprehensive study of school ﬁnance in 1992–93, 
the US General Accounting Ofﬁce (1997) ﬁnds that, 
while most states attempt to equalize funding across 
school districts, wealthier districts in 37 states had more 
total funding than poor districts, after controlling for dif­
ferences in geographic and student-needs-related costs 
such as special education. The imbalance averaged 24% 
on a per pupil basis across states, with California needing 
to shift 35% more state funds from wealthy to poor or 
middle-class districts in order to meet equalization cri­
teria. The imbalance appears to be a result of wealthier 
districts supplementing their shared tax revenue with 
fees and parental contributions as well as political forces 
in the redistribution process in Sacramento. 
3. Hypotheses 
The public exchange model predicts that price advan­
tages that public schools enjoy over private schools and 
exclusive territory constraints within school districts dis­
courage competition. Although Serrano has not brought 
perfect equality of funding in California, it created a sys­
tem of shared taxation that supports a monopolistic pub­
lic school market. Public education is therefore predicted 
to exhibit behaviors consistent with the model of public 
exchange within a setting of monopoly; i.e., school dis­
tricts with few or no competitors should be out-perfor­
med by districts with more competitors. 
Another hypothesis is that spending and performance 
are not necessarily directly related. One reason for ambi­
guity is that, since local government control over 
ﬁnances is imperfect under shared taxation, policy mak­
ers and local taxpayers have little incentive to be cost-
conscious in a setting where funding dollars come from 
a communal and statewide funding pool. Coupled with 
Niskanen’s (1971) theory of bureaucracy whereby mon­
opoly governments maximize functions other than pro­
ﬁts, higher funding is not necessarily a sign of higher-
quality education. Downes (1996) ﬁnds evidence that 
California school districts had monopoly power before 
and after Proposition 13, although somewhat less after 
Proposition 13. Evidence of monopoly behavior was that 
administrators substituted improved student performance 
for greater numbers of administrative staff. 
Local taxpayers may also believe that, at the margin, 
higher local spending may be funded from taxpayers of 
other areas since all school districts compete against one 
another for communal statewide funds. Under shared 
taxation there may be less resistance at the local level to 
oppose spending increases since local funding levels are 
now less related to local tax burdens. Within this setting, 
taxpayers may not be particularly vigilant in their efforts 
to control excessive spending, and possibly may lobby 
for spending growth on the assumption that their tax bills 
will rise less than local gains in spending. Moreover, a 
Niskanen (1971) asymmetric information problem may 
exist whereby state ofﬁcials, or local taxpayers/parents 
in our application, experience high monitoring costs and 
lack of private market counterparts with which to assess 
arguments that school district ofﬁcials make for higher 
funding. Such a setting suggests that higher spending 
will not necessarily indicate higher-quality education and 
further contributes to ambiguity about the spending–per­
formance relationship. Higher spending may simply 
reﬂect higher monopoly power and therefore may be 
associated with either higher or lower performance. The 
spending–performance relationship is therefore ambigu­
ous and we cannot rule out that higher spending is sim­
ply a function of greater monopoly power, or even that 
an inverse relation between spending and performance 
arises when spending is relatively high, and performance 
relatively poor, as a result of monopoly power. 
4. Testing methodology 
4.1. Performance measures 
Appropriate measurement of school performance is 
obviously important as parents need good information by 
which to base schooling choices and policy makers need 
to somehow determine which schools perform well and 
which perform poorly. While spending used to be the 
most commonly used barometer of performance, the 
empirical evidence makes clear that education spending, 
by itself, is a poor gage of how well schools educate 
students. Hanushek’s (1986) survey of 65 studies con­
cludes that little connection between inputs and output 
exists and even the few studies that ﬁnd a signiﬁcant 
effect from spending also ﬁnd that effects are mostly 
trivial in magnitude. 
Several studies have measured effects of schools on 
students through subsequent earnings of those students. 
This approach assumes that the effect of a school on a 
student is ideally one that lasts a lifetime. However, evi­
dence provided by Betts (1995, 1996) and Grogger 
(1996) indicates little effect of school resources, such as 
spending and class size, on subsequent earnings. Unfor­
tunately, this evidence suggests that performance of pub­
lic schools may be worse than previously thought since 
students do not appear to gain the ability to earn higher 
incomes later in life when we raise school spending or 
other inputs today — thus suggesting that resources are 
not used wisely. The evidence, however, is mixed on this 
issue, as Card and Krueger (1992, 1996) argue that 
higher spending raises labor market outcomes of stu­
dents. 
Perhaps the growing interest in class-size reduction is 
a result of growing awareness by the public and policy 
makers that higher spending, by itself, is not the way to 
solve the problems of public education. Hanushek (1998) 
notes that proposals for class-size reductions are a rally­
ing point for parents, teachers, and administrators across 
the nation, and politicians have rushed to claim credit 
for introducing policies aimed at reducing class sizes. 
The pupil–teacher ratio, for example, is frequently 
becoming the fundamental metric for quality which has 
begun replacing spending per student as the common 
measure of adequacy and equity. There is little evidence, 
however, that class size exerts any systematic effect on 
student performance, although it certainly is related to 
overall costs. While it appears to be commonsense that 
lower class sizes should be associated with higher stud­
ent performance, Hanushek (1998) concludes that the 
empirical evidence does not strongly support this belief. 
The evidence on class size is, however, mixed. Eberts 
and Stone (1984) ﬁnd that class size is an important fac­
tor explaining school performance. It is also possible that 
research that ﬁnds no relation between class size and per­
formance is based on class sizes that are larger than what 
educators believe can make a signiﬁcant difference. 
Glass and Smith (1978), for instance, show that 
reductions in classes that contain below 21 students exert 
signiﬁcant effects, but little effect occurs in larger 
classes. Perhaps this explains why class sizes of 20 and 
below are often the goal of policies seeking to lower 
class size in elementary schools. This view also suggests 
that previous research showing no relation between class 
size and student performance is a result of class sizes 
being too large to demonstrate beneﬁts of class-size 
reduction. 
The teacher–student ratio is examined here because 
parents commonly view class size as an important per­
formance gage. It is an easily observed measure and it 
is also likely that responsive administrators will respond 
to apparently strong parental preferences for small 
classrooms. The hypothesized relationship is ambiguous 
between teacher–student ratios and the degree of compe­
tition in the public education market. More competitive 
markets may tend to have more teachers per student, as 
school policy makers are hypothesized to be more 
responsive to parental preferences for smaller class sizes 
when they operate under more competitive conditions 
than when they operate in less competitive markets. It is 
also likely that if administrators and staff prefer to 
receive income in the form of salary and beneﬁts rather 
than in smaller class sizes, they may also prefer larger 
class sizes as the hiring of additional teachers means 
fewer dollars for themselves. If true, this also means that 
less competitive markets allow this preference to be 
more fully exploited, thus suggesting that, as markets 
become more monopolistic, class sizes rise as measured 
by falling teacher–student ratios. However, even though 
administrators and staff may prefer larger class sizes so 
as to receive higher salaries, they may be constrained in 
their efforts to divert income to themselves in this man­
ner. Salaries, for instance, are highly observable and 
therefore may receive greater public scrutiny than other 
forms of compensation such as beneﬁts, class sizes, and 
paid holidays. The relationship between teacher–student 
ratios and monopoly power is therefore an empirical 
question. 
In 1993, the average teacher–student ratio at the 
county level was 0.048.14 The average classroom was 
therefore composed of 20 students per teacher. The range 
for the teacher–student ratio was 0.083 to 0.04, and the 
median value was 0.046. 
Test scores on standardized tests are also examined. 
While test scores on standardized tests have been fre­
quently used to measure student achievement, Summers 
and Wolfe (1977) argue that the distribution of test 
scores should somehow be accounted for in order to 
appropriately gage performance. This argument is based 
on the observation that students in the tails of the distri­
bution typically receive the marginal dollar of school 
expenditures, either through special services or classes 
for disadvantaged, special or gifted students. 
The CLAS Grade Level Performance Assessments 
were administered to fourth, eighth, and tenth graders 
throughout California during school year 1993–94 and 
covered reading, writing, and mathematics. There are six 
performance levels, 1 through 6, with performance level 
6 being the highest. Table 1 displays the percentage of 
students achieving at or above performance level 4 — a 
measure used by the California Department of Education 
as its common measure of school performance. For grade 
4, the following percentages of students achieved at least 
level 4: 21.58% (reading), 29.23% (math), and 30.35% 
(writing). For grade 8, the following percentages of stu­
dents achieved at least level 4: 40.37% (reading), 25.25% 
(math), and 47.23% (writing). For grade 10, 32.60% 
(reading), 15.09% (math), and 38.82% (writing) of stu­
dents achieved at or above level 4. It is hypothesized 
that more competitive public education markets will be 
14 The county average is calculated by taking the average of 
school districts. 
Table 1 
Percentage of students achieving at or above performance level 
4: summary statistics 
Grade 4 Grade 8 Grade 10 
Reading 
Mean 21.58 40.37 32.60 
Median 21.00 41.00 32.00 
Maximum 35.00 68.00 50.00 
Minimum 11.00 22.00 17.00 
Standard deviation 5.47 8.87 7.70 
Observations 58 57 57 
Math 
Mean 29.23 25.25 15.09 
Median 29.00 26.00 14.00 
Maximum 52.00 49.00 30.00 
Minimum 15.00 9.00 6.00 
Standard deviation 7.66 8.37 5.51 
Observations 57 57 57 
Writing 
Mean 30.35 47.23 38.82 
Median 39.00 48.00 39.00 
Maximum 56.00 71.00 56.00 
Minimum 19.00 28.00 19.00 
Standard deviation 7.86 8.79 7.86 
Observations 57 57 57 
those with higher percentages of students achieving at or 
above performance level 4. 
4.2. Competition measures 
Studies have concluded that greater competition yields 
higher student performance. Borland and Howsen (1992) 
examine whether public school competition improves 
school performance, where the Herﬁndahl index based 
on school districts within a county measures competition. 
Average scores for reading, language, and math for third-
grade students within a school district measure school 
performance based on 170 school districts in Kentucky 
during 1989–1990. Greater competition is found to yield 
higher student performance and lower teacher salaries. 
Borland and Howsen (1993), in a re-test of Borland and 
Howsen (1992), ﬁnd that a Herﬁndahl score of 0.50 is a 
critical threshold which, assuming an even distribution 
of students across school districts, means that two dis­
tricts make a competitive market. Thus, test score gains 
from competition do not require many schooling choices. 
Blair and Staley (1995) examine whether competition 
from neighboring school districts exerts a positive inﬂu­
ence on local school performance. They examine 266 
school districts in the six largest metropolitan areas of 
Ohio and measure performance as a composite index of 
mean scores for reading, mathematics, and language arts 
among students in the fourth, sixth and eighth grades. 
The primary measure of competition is the average test 
score in contiguous school districts, based on the hypoth­
esis that nearby school districts that perform well exert 
beneﬁcial effects on local performance. They ﬁnd that 
higher performance of adjacent districts exerts a positive 
effect on performance in the subject district, thus indicat­
ing that beneﬁcial effects on adjacent districts are pro­
vided when a school district becomes more competitive 
on the basis of test scores. 
Hoxby (1994) examines how expanding public school 
choice in metropolitan areas would inﬂuence school per­
formance. She expands choice by using exogenous vari­
ation in the concentration of school districts measured 
by the Herﬁndahl index on enrollment shares. Easier 
choice is found to lower per-pupil spending, lower 
teacher salaries, and expand class sizes. However, the 
same areas also exhibit higher average student perform­
ance, thus indicating that greater competition fosters 
higher-quality education. 
Marlow (1997) examines whether competition meas­
ured by numbers of school districts and schools exerts 
beneﬁcial effects on student performance. This cross-
state study measures performance by average SAT 
scores, eighth-grade mathematics proﬁciency, and high 
school drop-out rates over 1988–1990. Greater compe­
tition through greater numbers of school districts is 
found to raise public education spending, but greater 
competition also is found to promote higher student 
achievement. 
Zanzig (1997) examines whether greater competition 
among school districts improves public school perform­
ance using 1970 data on 337 school districts in Califor­
nia. Student achievement is measured by test scores of 
high-school seniors (arithmetic portion of the Iowa Tests 
of Educational Development). Two alternative measures 
of competition are examined: the Herﬁndahl index and 
number of school districts per county. Greater compe­
tition is found to improve student achievement, and it 
takes between three and ﬁve school districts to make a 
completely competitive education market. That is, test 
scores rise with numbers of school districts, with a point 
of saturation reached between three and four districts — 
a minimum of three districts is necessary to reach the 
competitive threshold. Thus, Zanzig (1997) concludes 
that counties that have one or two school districts should 
consider restructuring their school system into three or 
more districts if they are interested in improving stud­
ent achievement. 
The present study measures public school market 
competition by the Herﬁndahl index as this measure 
appears to have become the measure of choice in the 
literature. California provides a rich data set with its 57 
counties and over 1000 school districts. It is appropriate 
to use counties as the unit of observation since California 
school districts are organized within counties and over­
seen by county boards of education, all of which are 
elected except for Los Angeles county’s board which is 
appointed by its Board of Supervisors. The Herﬁndahl 
index is the sum of squared shares in each market and 
therefore has a minimum value of near 0 and a maximum 
value of 1. Lower values indicate competitive markets 
and, at the extreme value of one, a perfect monopoly 
since this means that a sole ﬁrm controls the market. 
Three Herﬁndahl index measures are calculated — 
one for each grade level of performance data. Separate 
calculations for each grade level begin by determining 
which schools offer the particular grade level. 
Enrollment at this grade level for each school district is 
then determined, followed by calculation of its share of 
total county enrollment. The square of each school dis­
trict’s share of total county enrollment at this grade level 
is then summed to provide the Herﬁndahl score. 
Table 2 displays summary statistics for the three Her­
ﬁndahl index calculations. Mean Herﬁndahl scores are 
0.32 (fourth grade), 0.32 (eighth grade) and 0.42 (tenth 
grade). The higher value for the tenth grade is not sur­
prising since there tend to be many more elementary 
schools than there are high schools, thus fostering more 
schooling choices at lower-grade levels than at the 
higher-grade levels. The Herﬁndahl scores indicate that 
lower-grade levels therefore provide more competitive 
environments than do higher-grade levels. 
5. Spending and performance equations15 
The following models of cross-county spending and 
performance equations are estimated: 
EXPi =f(Yi, DENSITYi, STUDENTi, STATEi, 
FEDERALi, BLACKi, HISPANICi, ASIANi, HERFi) 
(1) 
Table 2 
Herﬁndahl scores: summary statistics 
Grade 4 Grade 8 Grade 10 
Mean 0.32 0.31 0.42 
Median 0.19 0.20 0.32 
Maximum 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Minimum 0.06 0.06 0.08 
Standard deviation 0.29 0.28 0.27 
Observations 58 58 58 
15 An alternative empirical approach is to estimate frontier 
production functions that provide information on the level of 
efﬁciency that public schools obtain. Cooper and Cohn (1997) 
develop this approach and demonstrate how its use on data on 
public school classes in South Carolina result in different results 
than when the “educational production function” approach (e.g., 
that used in the present paper) is used. 
and 
PERFi =f(EXPi, Yi, DENSITYi, STATEi, FEDERALi,
 
BLACKi, HISPANICi, ASIANi, HERFi),
 
(2) 
where 
EXPi 
Yi 
= 
an
= 
education spending per pupil at the pri
d secondary levels, in dollars 
per capita personal income, in dollars 
mary 
DENSITYi = population divided by square miles 
STUDENTi = student share of the population 
STATEi = state share of education funding 
FEDERALi = federal share of education funding 
BLACKi = Black percentage share of student popu­
lation 
HISPANICi = Hispanic percentage share of student 
population 
ASIANi = Asian percentage share of student population 
HERFi = Herﬁndahl index score 
PERFi = reading, writing, and math achievement, and 
teacher–student ratios 
Eq. (1) regresses education spending per pupil on the 
following factors. Per capita personal income is expected 
to exert a positive inﬂuence on spending when it reﬂects 
the county’s demand for education funding. Population 
density is expected to exert a positive inﬂuence on 
spending since it is often argued that more urban areas 
have higher costs than more rural areas. Duncombe and 
Yinger (1997), for example, argue that inner-city schools 
costs more, but they also are more inefﬁcient when given 
additional state aid than schools not located in the inner 
city. The student share of the population would exert a 
positive inﬂuence on spending when it inﬂuences the 
strength of the demand for education spending by par­
ents. On the other hand, an increase in the students’ share 
might increase the tax price of education, thus possibly 
reducing the demand for education by taxpayers. Two 
studies ﬁnd that voter age inﬂuences public spending on 
education. Miller (1996) ﬁnds that parents of school-age 
children have exerted an increasing positive inﬂuence on 
public school spending. Poterba (1997) ﬁnds that an 
increase in the fraction of elderly residents in a state is 
associated with a signiﬁcant reduction in per-child edu­
cational spending on K-12 education. 
Shares of funding through state and federal revenues 
may exert two opposed effects on spending. One poten­
tial effect follows the Brennan and Buchanan (1980) 
hypothesis that more centralized funding causes tax­
payers to perceive tax burdens to be lower than when all 
funding is local. Under this view, greater use of state 
and/or federal funding will cause voters to demand more 
spending under the ﬁscal illusion that it is cheaper than 
local funding and therefore a positive relationship 
between state and federal shares of funding and edu­
cation spending would follow. The other potential effect 
is a product of California’s effort to equalize spending 
across school districts. With these efforts, we should 
expect that greater funding through state and federal 
sources would be targeted to those school districts with 
relatively few ﬁnancial resources. Therefore, if this 
occurs, then higher shares of state and federal funding 
will be related to relatively low levels of spending simply 
because these jurisdictions would normally have rela­
tively small spending levels as a result of being relatively 
poor. Given that equalization efforts have been fought 
by richer districts and supplemented by other ﬁnancing 
sources, higher shares of state and federal funding would 
tend to rise in jurisdictions that tend to spend relatively 
less on education. Given these two potential and offset­
ting effects on education spending, the net effect remains 
an empirical question to be resolved through estimation. 
The public exchange view predicts that more concen­
trated districts would have higher spending since policy 
makers in the more-concentrated districts enjoy greater 
monopoly power than those in less-concentrated dis­
tricts. The alternative view is that because greater con­
centration allows greater scale economies, there will be 
a negative relation between Herﬁndahl scores and spend­
ing. These two predictions are therefore opposite in 
direction and the net effect is an empirical matter. 
Eq. (2) regresses performance measures on various 
factors. Performance is measured four ways: percentage 
of students achieving at or above performance level 4 in 
reading, math and writing, and the teacher–student ratio. 
Expenditures per pupil are expected to exert a positive 
effect on performance according to the conventional 
view. But, as discussed previously, bureaucracy theory 
suggests that higher spending by itself need not ﬁlter 
down to higher performance. The connection between 
education spending and program quality is therefore 
ambiguous: higher spending could simply reﬂect higher 
costs with little connection to higher performance due to 
higher monopoly power, or it could also reﬂect higher-
quality school programs. The net effect remains an 
empirical question. 
Per capita income is expected to exert a positive 
inﬂuence on performance since it is commonly believed 
that income and educational achievement are positively 
related. That is, the higher are parents’ income, the 
higher will be the demand for quality education as meas­
ured by higher test achievement or small class sizes. 
Population density controls for the effect of urbanization 
on performance and it is often believed that greater den­
sity leads to lower performance. State and federal shares 
of funding control for whether non-local funding inﬂu­
ences performance. 
Median education is expected to exert a positive 
inﬂuence on performance based on the assumption that 
the higher is local educational attainment, the greater the 
demand for high academic achievement of local children. 
The percentages of student populations that are Black, 
Hispanic or Asian are additional control variables that 
might explain variation in performance. Sander (1992) 
ﬁnds that ethnic and religious effects on educational 
attainment are partly explained by differentials in par­
ental endowments such as parents’ schooling and 
father’s occupation. 
Herﬁndahl scores are expected to negatively inﬂuence 
test achievement under the public exchange model since 
higher values reﬂect less competition in the public edu­
cation market. A positive relationship is predicted by the 
alternative view that greater concentration allows greater 
scale economies that then allow more spending dollars 
to be diverted to those areas that most beneﬁt students. 
For example, scale economies might allow highly con­
centrated school districts to offer greater variety of 
courses, better facilities or other means of fostering stud­
ent achievement. Once again, there are potentially 
opposing effects on student achievement from this mon­
opoly power variable and actual effects remain empiri­
cal issues. 
Herﬁndahl scores are expected to negatively affect the 
teacher–student ratio under the public exchange model 
when parents strongly believe that smaller class sizes are 
an important component to school performance. Even if 
policy makers do not believe that lowering class size will 
raise student achievement, the public exchange model 
predicts that they have little choice but to conform to 
these parental preferences when they operate in competi­
tive education markets. That is, Herﬁndahl scores should 
be negatively related to teacher–student ratios. More­
over, as discussed previously, if administrators and staff 
prefer to receive income in the form of salary and bene­
ﬁts rather than in smaller class sizes, they may also pre­
fer larger class sizes as the hiring of additional teachers 
means fewer dollars for themselves. If true, this also 
means that less-competitive markets allow this prefer­
ence to be more fully exploited, thus suggesting once 
again that, as markets become less competitive as 
reﬂected by higher Herﬁndahl scores, teacher–student 
ratios should fall. However, it is not clear that public 
opinion will allow signiﬁcant hikes in salaries, and there­
fore higher compensation may arise in other areas such 
as beneﬁts, paid holidays, etc. 
An alternative view is that more teachers (per student) 
may be hired with cost savings that follow higher scale 
economies associated with higher Herﬁndahl scores. 
This view assumes that policy makers do not exploit 
monopoly powers along the lines of bureaucracy theory 
and that policy makers believe that smaller class sizes 
are useful outlets for cost savings that arise from scale 
economies associated with relatively concentrated edu­
cation markets. A positive relationship between Herﬁn­
dahl scores and teacher–student ratios is predicted under 
these assumptions. The relation between Herﬁndahl 
scores and teacher–student ratios is therefore ambiguous. 
Data for these variables are available for most counties 
during 1993. Two sparsely populated counties did not 
participate in many of the data collection efforts of the 
California Department of Education, thus providing from 
53 to 55 observations out of the 57 counties. Signiﬁcance 
of estimated coefﬁcients is based on two-tailed tests at 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. 
The California Department of Education provides raw 
data at the level of school districts. These data were then 
aggregated to the county level and then compiled into a 
master ﬁle with data collected from other sources. Data 
at the county level collected from the California Statisti­
cal Abstract of 1996 are: per capita income, population, 
and median numbers of years of schooling (only avail­
able for 1990). 
Table 3 displays summary statistics of the data that 
have not already been discussed in Table 1 (student 
achievement) and Table 2 (Herﬁndahl scores). Education 
spending per pupil averages $4188.70, with a range of 
$5357.82 to $3529.21. As evidence of the spending 
equalization effort, the state share of funding variable 
averages 0.57, with a range of 0.80 to 0.18, thus indicat­
ing a wide range of state support. The federal share of 
funding averages 0.06, and with a range of 0.02 to 0.11 
indicates the relatively small role of the federal govern­
ment in attempting to equalize school spending through 
expending its own dollars. The racial mix of student 
populations show high diversity: Black (4.09% average, 
with range of 0% to 22.89%), Hispanic (23.58% average, 
with range of 1.99% to 78.65%) and Asian (5.04% aver­
age, with range of 0% to 38.75%). 
Table 3 
Summary statistics of remaining variables 
6. SUR estimation 
6.1. Education spending per pupil and performance 
equations 
The seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) method 
estimates the parameters of the system of spending and 
performance equations by accounting for contempor­
aneous correlation in the errors across equations. This is 
a recursive model that consists of a series of endogenous 
variables that are considered as a group because they 
appear to bear a close conceptual relationship to one 
another. Spending, measures of student performance 
(reading, math, and writing), and teacher–student ratios 
are often grouped together as indicators of public school 
performance by both the public and educators and there­
fore the SUR technique appears to be appropriate here. 
Relationships between these equations are indicated 
when the error terms of these equations are correlated 
and, in this case, the SUR model allows for more 
efﬁcient estimates than would arise under estimation by 
ordinary least squares. As Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1991, 
p. 310) discuss, SUR estimation is basically a two-stage 
estimation procedure that results in consistent and 
asymptotically efﬁcient estimates. 
Table 4 displays SURs of education spending and 
fourth-grade performance equations. In the spending 
equation, only the Herﬁndahl score exerts a statistically 
signiﬁcant effect — a positive effect, as hypothesized by 
the public exchange view that higher monopoly power 
leads to higher spending. In the reading achievement 
equation, education spending exerts a positive, but 
weakly signiﬁcant (0.10 level) effect, thus indicating that 
higher spending improves reading achievement. Median 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Standard deviation 
Education spending per student 4188.79 3529.21 5357.82 297.13 
Per capita income 19,267.25 12,776 38,687 4790.10 
Population density 470.75 1.81 15805.14 1601.28 
Teacher–student ratio 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.006 
Student share of population 0.18 0.08 0.25 0.03 
State share of funding 0.57 0.18 0.80 0.15 
Federal share of funding 0.06 0.02 0.11 0.02 
Median education 13.22 12.20 15.40 0.64 
Black student percentage 4.09 0.00 22.89 4.95 
Hispanic student percentage 23.58 1.99 78.65 17.43 
Asian student percentage 5.04 0.00 38.75 6.55 
c 
Table 4 

SUR estimations of education spending and fourth-grade performance (education spending: per pupil) 

Education spending Reading Math Writing Teacher– student ratio 
Constant 3224.96a �62.52a �61.31a �73.42a �0.02 
4.85 3.86 2.86 3.72 0.70 
Education spending 0.002c �0.001 0.002 1.24×10�5a 
1.60 0.84 1.41 6.88 
Per capita income 0.03 �0.0001 0.0004c �0.0003 �1.9×10�7 
1.56 0.74 1.85 1.18 0.61 
Population density 0.03 0.001 0.001 0.002 �3.8×10�6a 
0.027 1.07 1.45 1.20 3.05 
Student share of population �11.30 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
State share of funding 103.66 �5.59 5.09 �4.58 �7.4×10�5 
0.18 1.20 0.94 0.81 0.01 
Federal share of funding 4783.16 �20.99 �30.73 �44.09 �0.07 
1.40 0.61 0.74 1.06 1.59 
% Black �0.12 �0.47a �0.10 
1.59 1.15 3.81 0.73 0.73 
% Hispanic �0.01 �0.13a �0.03 
0.73 0.36 3.78 0.85 0.85 
% Asian 0.01 �0.20 �0.04 
0.85 0.09 1.39 0.26 0.26 
Median education 6.49a 6.97a 8.24a 0.002 
4.79 4.25 5.01 0.77 
Herﬁndahl 545.92a �4.13b �1.45 �3.38c 0.01c 
2.65 2.46 0.71 1.66 1.81 
R2 adjusted 0.07 0.72 0.80 0.71 0.56 
S.e.e. 375.73 2.94 3.45 3.57 0.01 
N 54 54 53 54 54 
a Signiﬁcance at 0.01 level (two-tailed test). 
b Signiﬁcance at 0.05 level (two-tailed test). 
Signiﬁcance at 0.10 level (two-tailed test). 
education behaves according to expectations since it is 
found to exert a strongly positive and signiﬁcant effect 
on reading achievement. The Herﬁndahl score is found 
to exert a signiﬁcant and negative effect on reading 
achievement, thus providing evidence in support of the 
public exchange view that less competitive school sys­
tems have relatively lower achievement. 
In the math achievement equation, signiﬁcant effects 
are found for per capita income (positive, as expected), 
median education (positive, as expected), and percent­
ages of Blacks and Hispanics in the student body 
(negative). Only median education (positive, as 
expected) and the Herﬁndahl score (negative, as pre­
dicted by the public exchange view) are found to exert 
signiﬁcant inﬂuences on writing achievement. For the 
teacher–student ratio equation, education spending 
(positive), population density (negative), and the Her­
ﬁndahl score (positive, but weakly signiﬁcant at the 0.10 
level) exert signiﬁcant effects. 
Table 5 displays SURs of education spending and 
eighth-grade performance equations. In the spending 
equation, only the Herﬁndahl score exerts a statistically 
signiﬁcant effect — the positive effect hypothesized by 
the public exchange view. In the reading achievement 
equation, education spending exerts a negative and sig­
niﬁcant effect. While the Black and Hispanic percentages 
of student bodies are found to be negatively related to 
achievement, the Asian percentage exerts no signiﬁcant 
effect. Median education exerts the hypothesized posi­
tive and signiﬁcant effect on reading achievement. The 
Herﬁndahl score is found to exert a signiﬁcant and nega­
tive effect on reading achievement, thus providing evi­
dence in support of the public exchange view. 
In the math achievement equation, education spending 
exerts a negative inﬂuence. Signiﬁcant negative effects 
are found for the Black and Hispanic percentages of 
student bodies, but no effect is found for the Asian per­
centage. Median education (positive) and the Herﬁndahl 
score (negative) exert signiﬁcant effects. In the writing 
achievement equation, education spending exerts a nega­
tive and signiﬁcant effect. The federal share of funding 
exerts a negative and signiﬁcant inﬂuence on perform­
 
 
c 
Table 5 

SUR estimations of education spending and eighth-grade performance (education spending: per pupil) 

Education spending Reading Math Writing Teacher– student ratio 
Constant 3201.43a 21.90 �47.91b 23.92 �0.01 
4.92 0.71 2.10 0.83 0.60 
Education spending �0.01a �0.003c �0.01a 1.23×10�5a 
3.64 1.75 2.79 6.71 
Per capita income 0.03 0.0003 �0.0001 �1.1×10�5 �2.1×10�7 
1.55 0.87 0.67 0.03 0.66 
Population density 0.04 0.001 0.001 0.0004 �3.7×10�6a 
0.40 0.42 0.63 0.30 2.97 
Student share of population 24.75 
0.01 
State share of funding 127.61 �2.62 �9.54 �9.25 �0.001 
0.22 0.32 1.42 1.27 0.11 
Federal share of funding 4712.08 �70.24 �28.11 �110.24c �0.07 
1.40 1.13 0.57 1.94 1.57 
% Black �0.39b �0.38a �0.24 
2.03 2.48 1.40 
% Hispanic �0.16a �0.15a �0.17a 
3.16 3.59 3.67 
% Asian 0.22 �0.01 0.50b 
0.99 0.03 2.45 
Median education 4.17c 7.79a 4.70b 0.001 
1.72 3.98 2.13 0.72 
Herﬁndahl 626.84a �12.89a �10.85a �6.83b 0.005 
2.96 4.05 4.25 2.37 1.64 
R2 adjusted 0.09 0.66 0.75 0.72 0.55 
S.e.e. 370.54 5.33 4.22 4.71 0.005 
N 54 53 53 54 
a Signiﬁcance at 0.01 level (two-tailed test). 
b Signiﬁcance at 0.05 level (two-tailed test). 
Signiﬁcance at 0.10 level (two-tailed test). 
ance. Although the Black percentage share of the student 
body is unrelated to performance, the Hispanic percent­
age (negative) and the Asian percentage (positive) are 
signiﬁcantly related to writing achievement. Median edu­
cation (positive, as expected) and the Herﬁndahl score 
(negative, as predicted by the public exchange view) 
exert signiﬁcant inﬂuences on writing achievement. For 
the teacher–student ratio equation, education spending 
(positive) and population density (negative) exert sig­
niﬁcant effects. 
Table 6 displays SURs of education spending and 
10th-grade performance equations. In the spending equ­
ation, the federal share of funding is found to exert a 
weak, but signiﬁcant, effect on spending. The Herﬁndahl 
score exerts a statistically signiﬁcant and positive effect. 
In the reading achievement equation, education spending 
exerts a negative and signiﬁcant effect. Population den­
sity (positive) and median education (positive) also exert 
signiﬁcant inﬂuences. In the math achievement equation, 
education spending exerts a negative inﬂuence on 
achievement. Signiﬁcant negative effects are found for 
the Black and Hispanic percentages of student bodies. 
Median education (positive) exerts signiﬁcant effects. In 
the writing achievement equation, only the federal share 
of funding (negative) and the Black percentage of the 
student body (negative) exert signiﬁcant effects. As in 
all previous estimations of the teacher–student ratio equ­
ation, education spending (positive) and population den­
sity (negative) exert signiﬁcant effects. 
6.2. Education spending per personal income and 
performance equations 
Spending per capita is often the barometer that the 
public and school ﬁnance authorities use to gage the 
adequacy of education resources because it focuses on 
resources allocated to “average” students. However, edu­
cation spending as a share of the economy reﬂects the 
extent to which government controls overall resource 
allocation and is often the focus of tests of the Leviathan 
hypothesis because it better measures the extent to which 
 
 
Table 6 

SUR estimations of education spending and tenth-grade performance (education spending: per pupil) 

Education spending Reading Math Writing Teacher– student ratio 
Constant 3117.78a �5.57 �41.39b �11.64 �0.02 
4.52 0.17 1.99 0.34 0.59 
Education spending �0.01b �0.004a 0.001 1.26×10�5a 
2.50 2.86 0.30 6.98 
Per capita income 0.03 0.0002 5.7×10�5 8.1×10�5 �1.9×10�7 
1.55 0.58 0.25 0.22 0.59 
Population density 0.06 0.004b 0.001 0.002 �3.6×10�6a 
0.58 2.33 1.50 1.39 2.79 
Student share of population �35.65 
0.01 
State share of funding �47.82 �9.99 6.28 13.21 �0.002 
0.08 1.25 1.26 1.64 0.33 
Federal share of funding 6490.81c 35.21 �42.27 �196.02a �0.06 
1.91 0.53 1.02 2.90 1.30 
% Black �0.27 �0.38a �0.37c 
1.37 3.03 1.84 
% Hispanic �0.07 �0.06c �0.08 
1.42 1.78 1.51 
% Asian 0.02 0.08 0.33 
0.10 0.57 1.41 
Median education 4.81c 5.52a 3.87 0.001 
1.91 3.52 1.52 0.63 
Herﬁndahl 580.02b �1.89 1.57 3.78 0.004 
2.54 0.54 0.72 1.07 1.36 
R2 adjusted 0.05 0.54 0.64 0.50 0.55 
S.e.e. 377.59 5.34 3.30 5.36 0.005 
N 54 53 53 53 54 
a Signiﬁcance at 0.01 level (two-tailed test). 

b Signiﬁcance at 0.05 level (two-tailed test). 

c Signiﬁcance at 0.10 level (two-tailed test). 
government takes resources away from private owners.16 
The previous equations are now run with public edu­
cation spending as a percentage of personal income sub­
stituted for spending per pupil. For 1993, public edu­
cation in California at the primary and secondary levels 
averaged 4.22% of personal income, and ranged between 
1.19% to 7.02%. Interestingly, the simple correlation 
coefﬁcient between education spending per personal 
income and education spending per pupil is only 0.17. 
Table 7 displays SUR estimations of education spend­
ing as a percentage of personal income and fourth-grade 
performance equations. In the spending equation, per 
capita income (negative), student share of population 
(positive), federal share of funding (positive), and the 
Herﬁndahl score (positive) exert statistically signiﬁcant 
effects. In the reading achievement equation, only 
median education (positive) and the Herﬁndahl score 
(negative) are signiﬁcantly related to achievement. In the 
16 See Oates (1989) for a survey of this literature. 
math achievement equation, education spending 
(negative), Black and Hispanic shares of student bodies 
(negative), and median education (positive) are found to 
exert signiﬁcant inﬂuences. Only median education 
(positive) exerts a signiﬁcant effect on writing achieve­
ment. Finally, education spending (positive), population 
density (negative), and the Herﬁndahl score (positive) 
are found to signiﬁcantly affect teacher–student ratios. 
Table 8 displays SUR estimations of education spend­
ing as a percentage of personal income and eighth-grade 
performance equations. In the spending equation, per 
capita income (negative), student share of population 
(positive), federal share of funding (positive), and the 
Herﬁndahl score (positive) exert statistically signiﬁcant 
effects. In the reading achievement equation, education 
spending (negative), Black and Hispanic shares of stud­
ent bodies (negative), Asian share of the student body 
(positive), and the Herﬁndahl score (negative) are sig­
niﬁcantly related to achievement. In the math achieve­
ment equation, Black and Hispanic shares of student 
bodies (negative), median education (positive), and the 
 
 
c 
Table 7 

SUR estimations of education spending and fourth-grade performance (education spending: percentage of personal income) 

Education spending Reading Math Writing Teacher– student ratio 
Constant 0.71 �69.93a �47.86b �84.26a �0.02 
0.80 3.71 2.18 3.69 0.44 
Education spending 0.50 �1.46b 0.69 0.002c 
0.89 2.36 1.01 1.74 
Per capita income �0.0001a �0.0001 0.0003 �0.0002 �2.2×10�7 
4.59 0.57 1.24 1.02 0.57 
Population density �6.1×10�5 0.001 0.001 0.001 �2.9×10�6c 
0.47 1.29 0.88 1.43 1.81 
Student share of population 28.36a 
9.13 
State share of funding �0.47 �7.33 8.73 �7.04 �0.003 
0.60 1.46 1.58 1.16 0.31 
Federal share of funding 9.40b �7.37 �34.53 �28.28 �0.02 
2.05 0.22 0.86 0.71 0.41 
% Black �0.07 �0.50a �0.03 
0.66 4.07 0.19 
% Hispanic �0.01 �0.11a �0.02 
0.17 3.39 0.65 
% Asian �0.04 �0.17 �0.11 
0.36 1.17 0.76 
Median education 7.36a 6.11a 9.36a 0.004 
4.96 3.63 5.22 1.39 
Herﬁndahl 0.57b �3.34b �0.38 �2.62 0.01a 
2.05 2.03 0.19 1.31 3.09 
R2 adjusted 0.88 0.71 0.82 0.70 0.28 
S.e.e. 0.51 3.02 3.30 3.64 0.01 
N 54 54 53 54 54 
a Signiﬁcance at 0.01 level (two-tailed test). 
b Signiﬁcance at 0.05 level (two-tailed test). 
Signiﬁcance at 0.10 level (two-tailed test). 
Herﬁndahl score (negative) exert signiﬁcant effects. In 
the writing achievement equation, education spending 
(negative), federal share of funding (negative), Black and 
Hispanic shares of student bodies (negative), Asian share 
of the student body (positive), median education 
(positive), and the Herﬁndahl score (negative) are sig­
niﬁcantly related to achievement. Finally, education 
spending (positive), population density (negative), and 
the Herﬁndahl score (positive) are found to signiﬁcantly 
affect the teacher–student ratios. 
Table 9 displays SUR estimations of education spend­
ing as a percentage of personal income and tenth-grade 
performance equations. In the spending equation, per 
capita income (negative), student share of population 
(positive), federal share of funding (positive), and the 
Herﬁndahl score (positive) exert statistically signiﬁcant 
effects. In the reading achievement equation, education 
spending (negative), population density (positive), and 
the Black share of the student body (negative) are sig­
niﬁcantly related to achievement. In the math achieve­
ment equation, education spending (negative), state 
shares of funding (positive), Black and Hispanic shares 
of student bodies (negative), and median education 
(positive) are signiﬁcant inﬂuences. In the writing 
achievement equation, the federal share of funding 
(negative) and median education (positive) are signiﬁ­
cantly related to achievement. Only the Herﬁndahl score 
(positive) is signiﬁcantly related to teacher–student 
ratios. 
7. Summary and conclusions 
The evidence supports several hypotheses. First, 
despite claims to the contrary by many advocates of pub­
lic education, higher education spending does not appear 
to raise student achievement. When deﬁned as spending 
per pupil, education spending exerts a negative inﬂuence 
on student achievement in ﬁve out of nine cases and, 
when deﬁned as spending as a percentage of personal 
income, it exerts a negative effect on student achieve­
ment in ﬁve out of nine cases as well. Spending per pupil 
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Table 8 

SUR estimations of education spending and eighth-grade performance (education spending: percentage of personal income) 

Education spending Reading Math Writing Teacher– student ratio 
Constant 0.66 40.43 �42.91 20.70 �0.01 
0.74 1.22 1.64 0.66 0.39 
Education spending �3.48a �0.81 �1.44a 0.002c 
3.62 1.01 1.61 1.81 
Per capita income �0.0001a �4.0×10�6 �0.0003 �0.0002 �2.1×10�7 
4.71 0.01 0.97 0.60 0.54 
Population density �4.52×10�5 �0.001 0.0004 �0.0003 �2.7×10�6c 
0.35 0.52 0.32 0.22 1.69 
Student share of population 29.06a 
9.46 
State share of funding �0.56 10.10 �6.47 �3.84 �0.004 
0.72 1.20 0.91 0.49 0.39 
Federal share of funding 9.35b �92.20 �46.48 �125.41b �0.02 
2.04 1.51 1.03 2.17 0.40 
% Black �0.62a �0.44a �0.34c 
3.25 2.85 1.93 
% Hispanic �0.16a �0.15a �0.17a 
3.16 3.66 3.63 
% Asian 0.40c 0.06 0.57a 
1.85 0.37 2.81 
Median education 1.77 6.91a 3.90a 0.004 
0.69 3.32 2.81 1.35 
Herﬁndahl 0.57b �12.22a �11.97a �7.51b 0.01a 
1.98 3.88 5.10 2.53 3.23 
R2 adjusted 0.87 0.64 0.74 0.70 0.29 
S.e.e. 0.51 5.50 4.32 4.86 0.01 
N 54 53 53 53 54 
a Signiﬁcance at 0.01 level (two-tailed test). 
b Signiﬁcance at 0.05 level (two-tailed test). 
Signiﬁcance at 0.10 level (two-tailed test). 
was found to exert a positive inﬂuence in one case and, 
in the remaining seven cases, no signiﬁcant inﬂuence 
was determined. 
Second, education spending tends to be highest in 
those counties exhibiting highest monopoly power as 
measured by the Herﬁndahl index. This result supports 
the predictions of bureaucracy theory since the ability of 
public education markets to draw funding is positively 
related to their degree of monopoly power. This result 
may suggest why higher education spending is not found 
to raise academic achievement since the higher spending 
may simply ﬂow to administrators, teachers and staff in 
ways that bear little connection to student achievement. 
While the empirical results show that education spending 
is positively related to teacher–student ratios, further 
study of where other dollars go, and what effects these 
have on student achievement, would be a useful addition 
to this study. 
While the majority of empirical results indicate either 
no link or a perverse link between spending and perform­
ance, it is difﬁcult to speculate about how performance 
might change if spending were cut across school districts 
in California. Perhaps, the inverse relation arises because 
high-spending districts tend to be districts with a certain 
set of characteristics, including monopoly power, polit­
ical intrusions into district policies and procedures, and 
poor student performance. However, a literal reading of 
the empirical results suggests that spending reductions 
across all districts would lead to either no effect on stud­
ent performance, or even improvements. Unfortunately, 
use of a simple cross-section of data does not allow us 
to distinguish between these competing hypotheses, 
whereas a panel of cross-sectional data might yield better 
understanding of this important policy issue. 
Third, median education levels of county residents 
exert strong inﬂuences on student achievement in the 
majority of cases (15 out of 18 cases). These results are 
consistent with the conventional wisdom that family 
inﬂuences such as parental education and involvement 
play instrumental roles in the development of student 
achievement. However, there is little evidence that per 
capita income plays much of a role. However, median 
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Table 9 

SUR estimations of education spending and tenth-grade performance (education spending: percentage of personal income) 

Education spending Reading Math Writing Teacher– student ratio 
Constant 0.49 �3.47 �30.69 �26.39 �0.01 
0.53 0.10 1.42 0.75 0.24 
Education spending �2.09b �2.03a 1.18 0.002 
2.10 3.27 1.17 1.54 
Per capita income �0.0001a �5.7×10�5 �0.0001 0.0001 2.2×10�7 
4.51 0.16 0.59 0.40 0.56 
Population density �2.2×10�5 0.003c 0.001 0.002 �2.4×10�6 
0.17 1.70 0.67 1.61 1.47 
Student share of population 28.10a 
9.13 
State share of funding �0.53 �3.85 12.73b 9.59 �0.001 
0.69 0.46 2.47 1.14 0.73 
Federal share of funding 11.34b 21.89 �49.53 �196.46a 0.01 
2.52 0.33 1.20 2.93 0.15 
% Black �0.35c �0.48a �0.31 
1.75 3.89 1.51 
% Hispanic �0.06 �0.06c �0.08 
1.24 1.74 1.54 
% Asian 0.10 0.17 0.28 
0.44 1.17 1.19 
Median education 3.72 4.13b 4.90c 0.003 
1.39 2.48 1.81 1.15 
Herﬁndahl 0.71b �1.37 2.43 2.76 0.01b 
2.36 0.39 1.11 0.77 2.55 
R2 adjusted 0.88 0.55 0.64 0.51 0.23 
S.e.e. 0.50 5.29 3.27 5.36 0.01 
N 54 53 53 53 54 
a Signiﬁcance at 0.01 level (two-tailed test). 
b Signiﬁcance at 0.05 level (two-tailed test). 
Signiﬁcance at 0.10 level (two-tailed test). 
education and per capita income data are aggregated to 
the county level and therefore do not necessarily track 
the inﬂuence that a parent’s education or income exerts 
on their own children. A more disaggregated analysis 
would clearly be helpful here in sorting out these par­
ental inﬂuences. It should also be noted that such factors 
go beyond the usual scope of short-term policy reforms, 
and at best represent long-term reforms that might 
affect achievement. 
Fourth, there is strong support (nine out of 12 cases) 
for the public exchange view that higher market power 
leads to lower student achievement in the fourth and 
eighth grades, and little support (one case out of six) for 
affecting achievement in the tenth grade. No evidence is 
found to support the hypothesis that higher market power 
raises performance. While the evidence appears to sug­
gest that greatest beneﬁts associated with greater choice 
in education providers arise during the formative years of 
schooling, this remains a conjecture at this point. Further 
research into why competitive structure appears to be 
more important in the lower levels would appear to be 
warranted. 
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